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The evolution of UK flood insurance:  Incremental change over six 
decades 
Our theorising here shifts away from the catalytic role of the flood itself – or 
other crises - towards a deeper understanding of the relationship between change 
and stability, taking the example of UK flood insurance and the agreements – and 
the implicit policy approaches –  between the relevant actors involved: the private 
insurers and the government.  This research relies upon in-depth analysis of the 
policy agreements governing flood insurance since the 1960s, and semi-
structured interviews with six current or ex-flood insurance professionals. We 
have found that the important agents of change have been, firstly, the threat to 
existing household insurers from new entrants unencumbered by agreements to 
insure all-comers. Secondly, the march of technological change has made 
exposure more explicit and pricing risk both easier and less expensive. But the 
slow pace of change and the relatively stable role of the different actors and 
coalitions is now clearer. The many significant windows of opportunity created 
by major flooding or financial crises have not significantly affected the pace or 
direction of policy change. The overriding importance of the London location for 
- and the profitability of - the insurance industry, both to government and to the 
insurers themselves, is our explanation for the extraordinary policy stability that 
we have described. This particular history suggests that the UK may not be a 
good model for imitation elsewhere. 
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Introduction 
Institutions, policies and approaches towards flood risk management (FRM) in the UK 
have undergone a substantive transition over the past 50 years or more, affecting the 
dominant philosophy, the type of risk reduction measures, and the implementation 
strategies (Tunstall, Johnson & Penning-Rowsell, 2004).  This transition has been 
characterised into three key phases and phrases: ‘land drainage’, ‘flood defence’ and, 
more recently, ‘flood risk management’ - each of which reflect a fundamental shift in 
the dominant beliefs, values and attitudes of society towards the flood problem 
(Johnson, Tunstall & Penning-Rowsell, 2005; Tunstall et al., 2004).  Research has also 
examined the impact of flood crises as creating ‘windows of opportunity’ for promoting 
and fostering policy change (Penning-Rowsell, Johnson & Tunstall, 2006).  
In this paper, the theorising shifts away from the catalytic role of the flood itself 
– or other crises - towards a deeper understanding of the relationship between change 
and stability, taking the example of flood insurance, its agreements, policy approaches 
and the actors involved: the insurers and the government (Defra; HM Treasury).  We 
examine flood insurance both because it is an important FRM measure in the UK and 
because an overview of this field over the past 50 years would suggest many years of 
relatively unusual policy stability.  It is also notable in that the private sector is centre-
stage – profit driven insurance companies – and therefore it differs markedly from most 
other measures in FRM which are in the public domain.  As we shall see, this 
profoundly affects outcomes because a major factor continues to be assuring the 
profitability of the private companies involved, not least to ensure that the government 
is spared the obligation and burden of a scheme of national flood compensation. 
Our research should be seen in its international context. There is a wealth of 
literature about the different current and past flood insurance models and their 
effectiveness (including CEA, 2005; CCS, 2008; Fiselier & Oosterberg, 2004; Gaschen, 
Hausmann, Menzinger & Schaad, 1998; Lamond & Penning-Rowsell, 2011), 
highlighting the relative uniqueness of the UK flood insurance model, with its private 
market basis and little direct government intervention. These reviews also show that 
insurance (and compensation) arrangements in other European countries, for example, 
have undergone many recent and fundamental reforms (e.g. Belgium in 2003/5; 
Denmark 2000; France 1982; The Netherlands 2000) and that the US NFIP has only 
been in its current guise for some 35 years (Lehrer, 2008; Michel-Kerjan, 2010).  
In the paper we therefore seek to understand the UK arrangements, and its 
special character, not least to show how it may not be a model for imitation elsewhere, 
owing to its unique history. We do this by first outlining our methodology and 
important limitations, and the classic theories concerning policy evolution. We then 
catalogue the many stages of flood insurance policy and practice since the 1960s, and 
seek to discuss this empirical material in the general context of the theories that frame 
our analysis. We briefly conclude with some comments about the value for this policy 
area of the policy change theories we have described, and some suggestions as to how 
the situation might evolve in the future given the many forecasts of greater flood risk as 
a result of climate change. 
Methods and Limitations 
This research relies upon in-depth analysis of the policy agreements governing flood 
insurance since the 1960s (ABI, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2008; BIA/FOC 1961; Defra, 
2013a) in the context of other FRM policy decisions which may have influenced the 
provision of flood insurance (e.g. Defra, 2005). We also draw upon Parliamentary and 
professional debates about flood insurance, to illuminate the several drivers for policy 
stability or change. An integrated policy analysis approach has been adopted which 
combines both a retrospective and prospective analysis of policy decisions (Dunn, 
2004), permitting comment on how previous policy evolution and decisions may impact 
on future flood insurance provision.  
But methodologically this field is far from easy: in many instances it is simply 
not possible to understand fully the pattern of drivers and events.  This is partly because 
‘commercial sensitivities’ abound in the insurance industry – whether real or invented. 
Policy evolution here has been as a result of repeated periods of intense negotiation 
between the key players, most of which has been ‘behind closed doors’ with little 
written evidence remaining. Briefings to Minsters are also unavailable and government 
motives appear even less easy to fathom here from their public pronouncements than in 
other areas. Also, the incremental policy changes that we are investigating are much 
more hidden than catalytic changes, which are often well publicised.  The forces that 
inhibit change – or promote no-change - are often deep seated within society and 
difficult to pinpoint and analyse: when there is no change, or very little change, this can 
be difficult to explain.  
To seek to remedy this situation, empirical data have been gathered through in-
depth semi-structured interviews with six current or ex-flood insurance professionals 
many of whom represented the insurance industry from 2000 to today (Table 1)
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.  Each 
interview was transcribed and analysed using a systematic process of open and selective 
coding adopting a grounded theory approach to data analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
We have thereby explored, as far as possible, the content, processes and power relations 
within these negotiations to better understand the key drivers involved and complement 
the documented formal policy agreements and associated published material.  Often, 
however, even these interviewees only had hypotheses about the cause of slow policy 
evolution, or periods of apparent change, rather than unambiguous information.  
Table 1 should be inserted about here 
 
Given these methodological difficulties, we are careful here not to ‘over-
interpret’ the evidence that we have collected, and anticipate that this paper provides 
only a first step in unpicking the hidden but important world of flood insurance. As time 
passes some of the negotiation processes may become less contentious and clearer, and 
that is an area for future research. 
Conceptualising policy change and stability 
We seek here to understand the slow and incremental evolution of FRM policy though 
an understanding of change itself.  
In this regard the policy science literature is awash with theories on how and 
why policy changes in certain contexts but is highly resistant to change in others 
(Birkland, 2005): we briefly review these ideas here.  A common strand is that policy 
subsystems are inherently resistant to change. The classic theories are that any 
significant change requires either an external shock or catalyst (Johnson et al., 2005; 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), or a combination of external pressures resulting in 
‘large leaps’ such that the status quo becomes ‘punctuated’ (Baumgartner & Jones, 
1993), or a ‘window of opportunity’ opens to connect successfully two or more 
components of the policy stream (Kingdon, 1995). Stability, conversely, implies that 
these change agents are weak or non-existent; hence their failure to facilitate change 
during the brief timeframe within which any ‘window of opportunity’ remains open. 
Stachowiak (2011) has identified three more theories that also raise questions 
regarding policy stability (Table 2). In challenging rational choice theory, Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1981) ‘Prospect theory’ is useful in arguing that change depends on how 
options are framed and presented. ‘Political Elite’ theory is valuable in that, drawing on 
the sociology of power relations, it focuses on influence concentrated in the hands of a 
few individuals (Domhoff, 1990; Wright Mills, 2000). And, finally, from social 
psychology, ‘Grassroots theory’ shows how community organisations can create power 
and, through mutual action, achieve change (Alinsky, 1989; Biklen, 1983).  
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Each of these theories is based on differing ontological, epistemological and 
theoretical understandings of change, leading to a number of profound questions of the 
policy process: Does policy change as a result of socio-economic context or human 
agency? Is it the networks of relations between actors, and their choices and bargaining, 
or their beliefs, ideas and interests themselves that dominate?  Is policy change 
constrained or enabled by institutional constraints and opportunities and contextual 
socio-economic conditions, or do ideas have ‘a life of their own’ (John 1998)? In this 
research we drew on this classical political science literature to provide a framework 
from which such questions can be asked of the flood insurance policy subsystem.  
If policy stability appears abnormal in FRM, this is counterintuitive to most 
theorists of policy change, who argue that under ‘normal conditions’ policies are indeed 
relatively stable. Where it is in the interest of powerful elites (Wright Mills, 2000), 
advocacy groups (Sabatier, 1999; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993), actor networks 
(Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) or policy communities, a set of shared core beliefs and values 
result in a common understanding of the policy domain, the main policy problems, and 
the desirability and feasibility of different policy options (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009).  
These groups resist change, creating a policy equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), 
serving thereby to further enhance their individual and collective interest and power in 
the strategic manipulation of the policy process. 
For some observers, however, policy stability is a result of inherent barriers to 
change – dominated by ideological values and beliefs, institutional constraints, the 
ingrained nature of public policy decision processes and the inadequacies of policy 
implementation (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970). For others there is active defence of the 
status quo by the power elites (Wright Mills, 2000).  From this perspective, policy 
subsystems are continually being created and destroyed by negative feedback. Only 
during times of positive feedback can issues be redefined and a new stability created 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). 
Huitema and Meijerink (2009) draw on Kay (2005) and Haas (1992) on path-
dependence and epistemic communities to suggest that each step down a policy path 
essentially increases the benefits of the current activity compared with other options. 
This institutionalises ideas and policies from particular advocacy coalitions or epistemic 
communities, which are then largely irreversible.  Here the dominant outcome is 
incremental and marginal policy shifts that match the changing interests of the powerful 
actors. The only changes to belief systems here is to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s 
(1993) secondary policy beliefs; core beliefs remain unchanged (Huitema & Meijerink, 
2009, p. 25-26). 
For Kingdon (1995), stability is maintained until there is a ‘policy window’ that 
can be exploited by policy communities and entrepreneurs.  These ‘windows’ can be 
predicable (e.g. elections) or unpredictable (e.g. floods). Triggers can be both dramatic - 
such as natural disasters, wars and revolutions - or they can be the result of less 
dramatic perturbations such as changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion 
and governance arrangements. But crises events rarely result in any fundamental shifts 
in policy (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2006); rather, as Huitema and Meijerink (2009) 
corroborate, they tend to act as a focusing event for accelerating policies along an 
existing path.  
Less dramatic perturbations appear to be equally (if not more) important in 
facilitating ‘windows of opportunity’ for change. Here, the gradual rationalising, 
reasoning and bargaining of policy entrepreneurs and coalitions over time can ensure 
that when socio-economic, institutional or governance conditions facilitate it, new 
policy ideas can be seen as the solutions to perceived problems. Indeed it can be the 
actions of the relevant political players themselves that provide the political will to 
foreground their particular policy ideas. Similarly, changes to relevant governance 
structures can provide policy entrepreneurs and coalitions with the ‘venue’ to exploit 
their policy ideals. This may be down to simple bargaining and negotiations in order to 
end a policy stalemate (Sabatier et al. 2005 in Huitema & Meijerink, 2009).  
What is clear is that most theorising suggests that, over a period of several 
decades, any particular policy subsystem is unlikely to be identical to its systems in the 
past.  These changes may be solely incremental or they may include cataclysmic or 
seismic shifts that have rapidly and dramatically altered policy domains.  Changes are 
likely to include a changing pattern of actors, differing state/private roles, changing 
distributional consequences of policies, and whether these are universal or selective.  
For flood insurance arrangements, it is these differing processes of change that we 
examine here, to seek to understand the relative policy stability that we observe.  
The evolution of UK flood insurance arrangements  
Flood insurance pre-1961 and the ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ 
Flood insurance is one of the cornerstones of UK FRM, and has been available for 
domestic properties in the United Kingdom for over 90 years (Table 3), becoming part 
of composite policies in 1922.  The take-up was reported to be relatively low initially, a 
likely combination of the lack of product awareness, other priorities on domestic 
budgets, and the lack of large scale floods before 1947 to demonstrate need (Arnell, 
Clark and Gurnell, 1984).    
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By the early 1960s this situation was changing and a number of larger floods 
including those in 1947 and 1953 highlighted the lack of flood insurance penetration 
(Interviewee 3).  At the time Government and local authorities were providing financial 
assistance to uninsured flood victims (Interviewee 1) and the high number of the 
uninsured  - up to 90% in Exeter floods of 1960 (Arnell et al., 1984) - raised concerns 
that providing compensation would become the norm and would be unaffordable 
(House of Commons, 1961).   Insurance industry concerns that the government was 
about to impose additional regulations on insurers and the creation of a National 
Disaster Fund (Arnell et al., 1984) led in 1961 to what has come to be known as ‘The 
Gentleman’s Agreement’ between the insurance industry and government (Arnell et al., 
1984; House of Commons, 1961; Interviewees 1,3).   The details were set out in a 
Memorandum on flood cover to be provided by the private insurance market, issued by 
the British Insurance Association and the Fire Officers Committee (FOC) (the 
predecessors of the Association of British Insurers (ABI)). Here insurers provided the 
following reassurance to HM Government: 
“Insurers...are prepared, on request, to provide Flood cover at reasonable rates for 
the contents of all private dwellings (including farm dwellings) which are 
permanently occupied.  Such cover will normally be granted only in conjunction 
with cover against Fire, and the Insurers may find it necessary to require that Storm 
and Tempest cover is also effected.  In the case of dwellings vulnerable to flood the 
additional rate for Flood cover would not normally exceed 10/-d%
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and the 
insurance would be subject to a small excess” (BIA/FOC, 1961, p. 4). 
This agreement formed the foundation for flood insurance for the next 40 years: 
universally available cover and by default the creation of a cross-subsidy to the at-risk 
from the risk-free (in that every householder was charged for flood cover, irrespective 
of risk). It was not, however, immediately successful in increasing penetration and 
reducing the exposure of government and local authorities to providing ex-gratia 
compensation payments.  Although the rationale behind the agreement was to provide 
the “assurance that Flood Cover will be available to everyone, including the ‘small 
man’” (BIA/FOC, 1961, p. 5) one of the Agreement’s key phrases was that insurance 
was available “on request”.  In reality, consumers were not asking for flood insurance 
cover to be added to their policies, and flooding in 1965 and 1968 showed that 
penetration had not increased significantly since the agreement (Arnell et al., 1984).  
This was recognised to be owing to a lack of awareness of the availability of cover 
(Interviewee 1, 6) and, in 1969, a publicity campaign was mounted by both the BIA and 
the UK Government with, for example, leaflets enclosed with all fire insurance 
renewals.  Local authorities also sought to raise insurance awareness with their tenants 
and, from the 1970s onwards, the Building Societies Association began making flood 
insurance cover mandatory for all of their mortgage business.   
Although the Gentleman’s Agreement’s aim was to increase insurance 
penetration and “get some extra value out of insurance” (Interviewee 1), flood insurance 
was not universal.  Those at high risk were meant to pay a modest increase in premium 
and the Agreement allowed those at the very highest risk to be excluded.  Despite these 
notable provisions, the situation in reality in the following 40 years was that flood 
insurance was considered to be universally available and there was very little pricing 
difference between high and low risk properties.  Penetration greatly increased during 
this period, particularly for buildings cover owing to the mortgage requirement, and 
flood insurance began being offered for commercial properties.  
Post-2000 and the ‘Statement(s) of Principles’ 
On the 20
th
 February 2001 the ABI issued a Memorandum to the UK government which 
heralded a period of apparent policy change. This was the first of a suite of formal 
policy agreements setting out commitments on both sides: “The general policy of (ABI) 
members will be to maintain cover for a minimum of two years for domestic properties 
and small businesses…which already had cover” (ABI, 2001, p. 1).  The express 
purpose of the agreement – actually remarkably similar to the ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ 
- was “to prevent Government intervention in underwriting policy and widespread 
criticism of the industry” (Interviewee 5).    
This was perhaps the beginning of a shift in power relations as evidenced by 
insurers beginning to increase the pressure on UK Government to take a stronger lead in 
FRM and improve their levels of investment.  The insurers now occupied a stronger 
position following the favourable reception of their performance after the 1998 and 
2000 floods, in contract to widespread criticism of the Environment Agency’s flood 
warnings in 1998 (Bye & Horner, 1998) and of spatial planning in 2000 (Johnson et al., 
2005). Maintaining cover responded to media concern at the time that many flooded 
households would find policy renewal difficult following the widespread 2000 event 
(Environment Agency, 2001).  However, our interviewees suggested there was also 
increasing pressure from the Government, with an implicit threat that “if the industry 
did not respond helpfully then the Government was going to make life a bit difficult for 
them” (Interviewee 2). Little comment was made publicly but during negotiations it was 
apparently made clear that unless some agreement was reached the situation might 
become “politically difficult for insurers” (Interviewee 2).  The Memorandum was seen 
by the ABI as a “‘band aid… to stop the debate rushing off into unhelpful territory” 
(Interviewee 2) and to give time for them to enable them to reposition themselves.   
The process of gradual change continued. The basic agreement was renewed and 
strengthened in September 2002 with the ABI’s Statement of Principles on the 
Provision of Flood Insurance (hereinafter ‘SoP2002’), to which all ABI members 
agreed.  It set out the general principles for companies offering flood insurance from 
January 2003 (ABI, 2002) and reflected the changes in flood management since 2001. 
These included Government flood defence spending commitments and the 
implementation of PPG25 concerned with spatial planning and development control in 
flood risk areas (DETR, 2001) (Interviewee 2).  The 2002 Statement ensured that flood 
insurance continued to be provided on a widespread basis, but reinforced the ABI 
position that flood risk should be reduced through improved flood defences, albeit with 
little consideration as to whether this was the appropriate FRM approach or even in line 
with government FRM policy in the form of Making Space for Water (Defra, 2005).  A 
Statement of  Principles clause guaranteed to cover properties only if they had flood risk 
lower than 1 in 75 years – in fact a very high standard -   or where defences were 
planned to do so. Where this protection was not provided, or where previously covered 
properties changed ownership, ABI’s insurers would assess the risks on a case-by-case 
basis and then “use their best efforts to continue to provide cover” (ABI, 2002, p. 5).   
The Statement of Principles (2002) can be seen as insurers showing a continued 
commitment to those residing in flood risk areas whilst protecting their profitability 
through refusing the highest risks and pricing accordingly: price was never a part of the 
Statement.  Our interviewees reported that many insurers felt that drifting away from 
the 1961 Agreement would enable companies to be more selective and better able to 
manage their risk.  However, although there is anecdotal evidence from this period that 
some people were unable to obtain insurance, in practice insurance was completely 
unavailable to very few properties (Interviewee 4) a situation supported by Lamond, 
Proverbs and Hammond (2009).  Instead, premiums from those flooded in 2000 may 
have risen in some cases, raising for the first time the issue of the affordability of the 
product.  Any premium increase, however, was not out of line with the Statement of 
Principles and ABI members generally followed the agreement (Interviewees 3, 5).  
The change in 2001 to the 40-year relationship with the introduction of SoP2002 
could, therefore, be analysed as a reaction to the widespread Autumn 2000 flooding in 
England and Wales (Environment Agency, 2001), the losses thereby sustained by the 
insurance industry, and concern that insurers would ‘red-line’ (i.e. refuse cover to) those 
properties which had been flooded.  But, instead, evidence from our interviews 
suggested that the 2000 event was only one of the factors leading to this change: it 
provided a ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 1995), or an excuse for change, but was 
not the only driver. Concern had been raised amongst insurers for some time about the 
scale of flood risk and research had begun prior to the 2000 floods into the scale of their 
exposure (ABI, 2000; Halcrow Group Ltd, HR Wallingford & John Chatterton 
Associates, 2001).  Additionally, insurers were now experiencing repeated flood claims 
from some properties; one interviewee stated that as early as 1990 they were committed 
to honouring the agreement to insure those people already on their books but were 
reluctant to insure other properties in these locations. There was the view that the 
Gentleman’s Agreement was sometimes encouraging “bad underwriting practices which 
were becoming more obvious” (Interviewee 6) and leading to excessively low 
premiums.  With UK flood losses increasing - £500-700 million in 1998 and £1+ billion 
in 2000 (Huber, 2004) - insurers became increasingly aware of potential loss-making 
exposure if their risk was not better managed. 
The Government’s response to the ABI Memorandum and to the SoP2002 is 
difficult to untangle.  Improved working relationships between members of Government 
and the ABI were considered themselves to be a positive outcome of the need to 
renegotiate and formalise matters, and the Government was seen to have responded 
constructively to calls for improvements in FRM. However, it is not possible to 
distinguish clearly between government action consequential upon the Autumn 2000 
floods and any reaction to insurance industry pressure.   
The original SoP2002 was established for a three year period and was therefore 
renegotiated in November 2005 (hereinafter ‘SoP2005’) for January 2006 to December 
2008.  The commitment by insurers remained the same with them maintaining the 
minimum standard of protection of 1 in 75 years; however the action required of 
government was strengthened and subject to an annual review against five performance 
targets: reducing the annual probability of flooding for substantial number of properties; 
at least maintaining flood investment spend every year; implementing spatial planning 
reforms; effectively communicating flood risk; and improving the approach to urban 
drainage.  This ‘tightening’ of the requirements on government was judged to be related 
to frustration within the industry about how long it was taking to increase standards of 
flood defence and its impact upon mitigating risk (Interviewees 2, 3). 
Towards the ending of the Statement of Principles  
Towards the end of the first decade of the 21st-century a fundamental change appeared 
to be in train. In July 2008 the Statement of Principles agreement was again reviewed, 
with the insurers again renewing their commitment to provide insurance cover more or 
less as before.  However, this agreement heralded a new phase in the relationship 
between Government and the insurance industry, with the ABI’s insistence that this 
would be the final time that the agreement would be renewed in its then current form. 
From July 2013 a new arrangement would be needed.  Otherwise SoP2008 represented 
few changes from the previous iteration, retaining the 1 in 75 years cut-off and 
reiterating that “Premiums charged and policy terms will reflect the level of risk 
presented” (ABI, 2008,p. 1).  The only significant change was that it now excluded 
newly built property from the commitment: the insurers would not support what they 
saw as unwise flood plain development (Interviewee 3) and their arguments carried the 
day. 
The renewal of the Statement of Principles in 2008 followed a period with high 
losses from the 2007 floods estimated at around £3 billion (Chatterton, Viavattene, 
Morris, Penning-Rowsell & Tapsell, 2010) with some insurers needing to draw on their 
reinsurance cover (Interviewee 5), a very rare if not unique occurrence for flooding in 
the UK.  Although the scale of the flooding “woke insurers up to the issues of surface 
water flooding” (Interviewee 5), it was not considered by our interviewees to be the 
catalyst for changes to the policy agreement: the 2008 update was part of the ‘normal’ 
triennial review cycle. Indeed our interviewees suggested that the ABI wanted to 
negotiate a new agreement sooner, ending the status quo earlier than in 2013, but that 
the 2007 floods may have prolonged the period of adjustment. The Statement was 
always seen as a “short fix” (Interviewee 3) but calling for change just after a major 
event would probably have been interpreted as ‘walking away’ and the consequential 
reputational damage was deemed unacceptable.  The different character of the 2007 
event – ‘surface water’ rather than floodplain dominated – also required a pause for 
thought as to what was needed to replace the ‘Statement of Principles’, given its 
foundations on the EA’s floodplain map. 
In 2013 a new ‘understanding’ was reached that seeks to replace the current 
‘Statement of Principles’, after protracted negotiations from 2011 to 2013 between the 
government and the ABI: “Getting to this stage has required compromise by both sides” 
(Thoresen, 2013, p. 1)
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. The proposal if confirmed will, from 2015, establish an 
arrangement to set an upper limit to flood insurance premiums (rendering them 
supposedly “affordable”), linking these to local Council Tax bands so that householders 
will know the maximum they will have to pay and those in the larger properties will pay 
more. To fund the continuation  of the cross-subsidy from those at low risk to those at 
high risk that this entails, a new and compulsory industry-backed levy will enable 
insurance companies to fund a not-for-profit ‘pool’ (termed  Flood-Re), at the rate of 
£180m per annum, to cover claims from those 500,000 households with premiums 
above certain “eligibility thresholds”. As these compulsory payments are in effect a tax, 
and the arrangement brings at least some state liability, legislation will require all UK 
household insurers to pay into this pool, at an estimated average annual rate of £10.50 
per household (from within the existing insurers’ revenue). The arrangement is seen as a 
transitional one: “while a gradual move to risk-reflective pricing in the longer-term 
would create additional incentives to reduce the likelihood and the cost of flooding” 
(Defra, 2013a; p. 14) “…successful implementation (of the agreement) would entail 
insurance terms adjusting towards risk-reflective pricing at a pace that allows choices to 
be made by policyholders facing long-term increases in insurance costs … and avoids 
any risk of instability in insurance, mortgage and local housing markets” (Defra, 2013b, 
p. 1). So the era of relatively informal agreements is likely to be over, and the full force 
of the law will be used to support the new scheme. The proposals in 2013 appear 
fundamental, and have been described as such (“a step-change better than the Statement 
of Principles” (Defra, 2013a, p. 6)), but we see them as only marginal changes to the 
system that has existed since the 1960s: a  formalisation of the previous cross-subsidy 
system with a continuation of universally available flood cover provided by private 
insurance companies. 
Discussion  
In interpreting the steady evolution of agreements and policy for flood insurance in 
relation to the classic theories of policy change briefly discussed above, we seek here to 
answer some questions in three areas related to the change theorising above: 
understanding the policy domain; understanding the policy subsystem: actors, coalitions 
and entrepreneurs; ‘windows’ for policy change and/or policy stability in flood 
insurance. These are tackled below in turn. 
The changing context for the policy domain  
Our questions here are, in relation to last 50 years, how important has been the wider 
context and hence external pressures in affecting the flood insurance domain and its 
policy; why has change not be more fundamental given so many other societal changes 
over this time?  
In response, we can see relatively few changes of flood insurance institutional 
structures and governance arrangements; these are driven by market forces as much as 
by policy and, in general, markets change slowly over time. But there have been a 
number of significant changes within the insurance market over the period of the 
Statement(s) of Principles, which have impacted on insurance provision.  Each 
represents a progressive tightening of the competitive environment. 
 First, the deregulation of building societies (Deregulation (Building Societies) 
Order 1995) meant that they were now able to write business and contents insurance. 
Additionally, this period saw the end of ‘block insurance provision’ for mortgage 
lenders and a greater freedom for both consumers to ‘shop around’ for flood insurance 
and for insurers in pricing premiums for individual properties. The other main 
contextual change has been EU directives, not concerning flooding but concerning 
competition policy and the solvency of insurance companies (Competition Act 1998; 
Solvency II). The former discouraged industry wide agreements and the latter imposed 
extra costs 
But many interviewees, however, suggested that these factors external to the 
provision of flood insurance – whilst important - have had less influence than might be 
assumed.  What has been important, apparently, has been the rise of ‘new’ insurers into 
the household market following 2000. This meant that there were a number of new 
participants and different streams of business within the insurance market (Interviewees 
1, 6).  They had little or no existing high flood risk business and no commitment to 
continue to insure this business under the terms of the Statement of Principles. This 
gave them a competitive advantage as they could choose to select the more profitably 
lower risk business (Interviewee 5).  One driver for change thereafter was therefore to 
seek to level the playing field amongst insurance companies.  
But with none of these changes was there a fundamental shift, more a gradual 
change in the marketplace, and the continuing ability of insurers to charge those not at 
risk (initiated under the Gentleman's Agreement) must have meant that the provision of 
household insurance - of which flood insurance is now an integral part - was profitable, 
leading to a disincentive to seek change (Interviewees 3, 5). 
But one aspect of contextual change is gradually and inexorably leading to 
change in the subsystem. Since 2000, insurance companies have been seen to be leading 
the way in the assessment of flood risk (Interviewees 1, 4) and steady technological 
advancements in flood modelling have enabled much more accurate assessment of all 
types of flood risk.  Developments in computer-based flood modelling over the last two 
decades emerged from our interviews as a key driver of incremental change within UK 
flood insurance provision, with significant improvements to both the extent and 
resolution of risk assessments. Data improvement also has been important:  the Flood 
Estimation Handbook (Reed, Faulkner, Robson, Houghton-Carr & Bayliss, 2000) 
together with the investment in rain and river gauging telemetry, a progressively longer 
data record, and the declining real costs of high speed data processing have meant 
significant advancements in flood risk assessment (Environment Agency, n.d.).   At the 
same time, insurance underwriting has also been radically changed by computer 
modelling, with more complex risk algorithms and the integration of more data from 
flood models and claims records. 
These developments allowed a progressively greater awareness of insurance 
companies’ total exposure to flood risk, and this led to a greater awareness by insurers 
of what they saw as deficiencies of FRM and greater concerns about the potential 
impact of climate change.  This was mirrored by – and often explains - the incremental 
evolution in the Statement of Principles, strengthening inter alia the requirement therein 
for increased flood defence investment and tighter spatial planning with its floodplain 
development controls.   
One insurance professional we interviewed argued that premiums are also not 
increasing quickly enough to reflect the risk (a finding supported by Ball, Werritty, & 
Geddes, 2013), for what the interviewee considered to be mainly reputational reasons.  
In a competitive market many insurers want to limit premium increases per renewal and 
therefore re-rating is taking a long time for high risk properties.  Other insurers are 
avoiding substantially raising household premiums due to concern about how the 
damage to their reputation may affect other areas of their business such as motor cover 
(Interviewee 5).  Insurers have been looking for solutions whereby they would not need 
to increase premiums beyond a certain level - i.e. a mechanism to deal with the highest 
risk and avoid affordability issues - or a solution that would give them an excuse to 
raise premiums along with the rest of the market.  Concern about this under-pricing has 
risen greatly as awareness of flood risk and the extent of under-pricing and therefore 
insurers’ exposure has become clear (ABI, 2010). It is this gradual advancement in risk 
assessment understanding that has, according to our insurance professionals, been the 
main driver of policy change. 
Many aspects of contextual change have therefore led to the slow evolution that 
we describe: changing market conditions; technological advancements; and reputational 
concerns. Many of the characteristics of the situation six decades ago continue to this 
day and appear liable to continue into the future. The external pressures were not such 
as to create the classic “large leaps” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993); they were strong, 
pervasive but not sudden. 
The policy subsystem: actors, coalitions and entrepreneurs  
Several questions are pertinent here, many of which are as yet unanswerable because 
many of the processes are hidden. But who are the powerful actors or elites in flood 
insurance? To which coalitions are they aligned? How have these elites promoted or 
blocked policy change, when and where? What is their dominant ideology, as illustrated 
by their core and secondary beliefs and values?  
Fundamentally there are two main ‘sides’ to the flood insurance issue – the 
insurers and the government (including Defra; Treasury).  Viewed in this way the actors 
have remained fairly stable over the last 50 years. In terms of elites (Wright Mills, 
2000) the ABI is the public face of the private insurance industry, which is backed by 
heavyweight capital interests, but it is only as strong as its members will give it support; 
and this is not guaranteed - although divisions are rarely made public owing to 
reputational risks. The insurance industry as a whole is extremely powerful within 
British society - although again largely hidden from view - because it earns very large 
amounts of foreign exchange at a time of chronic imbalances in payments elsewhere, in 
a UK economy rapidly losing its manufacturing base and its source of export income. 
The implication is that the government always seeks to maintain the industry’s 
profitability and have it located in London rather than see it migrate elsewhere. The 
strength afforded to the insurance industry by this position means that there is 
something akin to a parity of power between the government and the industry, rather 
than the latter being subservient to the former: an equality in power relations. 
But the ABI cannot always rely on its members agreeing with each other – and 
some insurers are not members - and therefore developing a position the ABI can put 
forward with strength is not always easy. This situation is also complicated later in the 
policy evolution described above by having some members signed up to the Statement 
of Principles and others, who have appeared in the market since 2001, not committed in 
this way. This weakens the ABI’s policy influence – for change or stability - because its 
support can be fragmented. Developing an unambiguous position also requires 
negotiation and lobbying at ‘second hand’ as the ABI itself is not directly involved in 
the market. 
Clearly the insurers want to avoid regulation and therefore this is one of their 
key aims when dealing with flood insurance. For instance, several of our interviewees 
mentioned the threat of regulation before the 1961 agreement and again in 2000, both 
pushing the industry (probably reluctantly) into some sort of informal agreement. They 
appear to have promoted a stable policy situation to avoid the possibility of tighter 
regulation at a time when they did not fully understand the risk they were insuring. As 
this understanding has increased, however, these same actors have sought incremental 
policy changes to try to push the UK government into spending more to reduce this risk, 
matching and using public reaction to the damaging floods as they occurred.  Now that 
they better understand the risk insurers face the ABI has sought policy change for its 
members – or at least an end to the Statement of Principles - through the formalization 
of the cross-subsidy in a way that maintains the revenue stream from insuring those at 
virtually no risk. Any non-member or late joiners ‘outside the coalition’ are forced to 
comply, through the proposed legislation. It looks anti-competitive, and it probably is. 
In terms of the debates and negotiations, for the 1961 Agreement the process 
appears very public and the key venue was the House of Commons with questions in 
parliament about insurance penetration etc.: on the government’s ‘turf’. But much of the 
negotiation occurred behind closed doors.  Following 2000 our Interviewees suggested 
that they had to build a relationship with government (i.e. Defra, the EA, the Treasury), 
which had not been there prior to this, and that securing the friendly relationship was 
more important than what was actually negotiated.  For the new ‘understanding’ in 2013 
there have been committees and consultations, at least at the level of tokenism: the real 
business of firm agreement remains hidden. 
In terms of entrepreneurs there have been many key people involved in the 
negotiations between government and the ABI at different times, but in the most part it 
is hard to see what influence individuals may have had on the process.  The chair of the 
General Insurance Council pushed for change in 2000 and sought, through the 
Statement of Principles, to buy some time to look for a longer-term solution (it lasted 12 
years).  But it is not clear that we should class this policy effort as entrepreneurial, 
rather it appears more conservative with efforts aimed at minimal change.  
On the periphery are other interested parties, such as policyholders represented 
by the “grassroots” National Flood Forum (NFF) (Alinsky, 1989), but each seems to 
have had little influence, including the mortgagers (the Council of Mortgage Lenders); 
surprisingly since they own or hold as collateral many of the assets at risk.  The role of 
this group did not feature in our interviews at all and others have also suggested that 
they are surprised the mortgagers are not more vocal. The role of community 
organisations and, in effect, the customers of the insurance industry is also surprisingly 
muted. The NFF developed the Morpeth flood group’s insurance model, suggesting 
segmenting the market and creating a pool for bad risks (Morpeth Flood Action Group, 
2013). But our interviewees commented more on the ABI’s very similar OXERA model 
(Oxera, 2011) which, of course, got more exposure and attention in government through 
the ABI mouthpiece and its clever deployment of media stories about vulnerable 
pensioners losing their flood cover: how options are framed and presented and by whom 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1981)) appears important both here and in the way that the 2013 
proposals have been explained as consumers facing little or no change (Defra, 2013). 
A further group who might have had the role of policy entrepreneur are the 
independent researchers, perhaps in universities. However, with some notable 
exceptions (e.g. Ball et al., 2013; Crichton, 2007; Lamond et al., 2009; O’Neill & 
O’Neill, 2013; Priest, Clark, & Treby, 2005) there have been few researchers actively 
engaged in this field, unlike, for example, in policy fields such as education or health. 
There has also been relatively little critique of the current arrangements, and certainly 
no academic policy entrepreneur has developed fundamentally new policy arrangements 
that have been acceptable to either government or the insurance industry. 
In reality, therefore, the fundamental goals of the flood insurance policy and the 
actors supporting it have remained the same on both sides but they have gradually 
moved towards a more precise and formalised policy and relationship, and continue to 
do so as they agree on the new Flood-Re. The overall aim of the policy (i.e. to have 
risk-based pricing and broadly a market-based system, whilst maintaining availability 
and affordability in high risk areas) has probably stayed relatively constant. The 
dominant ideology and the core values of the two main players have not changed in the 
last 50 years: the role of the regulated private market has continued to be the dominant 
theme, supported by both the government and the insurers, in the only effective 
coalition that has existed (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). No significant other actors 
or policy entrepreneurs have emerged to challenge or change the situation. No 
significant policy review has been undertaken, except in negotiations behind closed 
doors, and the players active in the policy subsystem have therefore continued in much 
the same way as they always have done.  
Policy ‘windows’ 
The questions pertinent here are whether there is any evidence of key ‘policy windows’ 
in this process that might have led to fundamental change? Have these come about by 
external forcing events in the policy domain such as changes in public opinion or 
socioeconomic conditions or have they come about as a result of crisis events, or less 
dramatically as a result of the bargaining and power of actors in the exploitation of any 
specific ‘policy window’? 
Here the situation appears to be clearer: the process of change might well have 
been accelerated by several catastrophic events.  The Autumn 2000 floods did have a 
major impact and were followed by the Memorandum and then the Summer 2007 event 
was followed by the announcement of the ending of the Statement of Principles. But 
there were arguments from our Interviewees that there were discussions about the 
continued validity of the Gentleman’s Agreement prior to the 2000 floods and that the 
ABI and insurers were becoming concerned about the ineffectiveness of flood defences 
and their growing exposures. Our Interviewees therefore questioned whether these flood 
events were causes of any changes, rather they were exploited as opportunities to show 
the value of insurance to those afflicted, by more rapid settlement of claims than 
hitherto. Some (marginal) policy shifts also occurred with SOP 2002, but far less 
important than major changes to spatial planning or flood warning systems (Johnson et 
al., 2005).  Indeed the 2008 update of the Statement of Principles was in train and would 
have occurred whether the summer 2007 floods had happened or not - and the ABI was 
already considering that there needed to be a new type of agreement – but arguably the 
floods raised the issue again with both insurers and government and pushed along the 
process of policy evolution.   
A further issue occurring at the same time as the 2007 floods was the global 
financial crisis, significantly affecting major insurers in the USA.  Our interviewees 
mentioned that in reality this might not have had the impact that one might suppose, but 
might have acted as another uncertainty and seen as a possible problem, thereby 
providing another rationale for subtle policy change. The main driving factor suggested 
by most interviewees, as discussed above, was increases in the understanding about 
flood risk and improvement in flood risk modelling, and as we have seen this was a 
gradual process.  
There is no doubt that there have been events in the last 50 years which could 
have created windows for major policy change in the field of flood insurance, but the 
reality seems to have been that such windows as occurred were not particularly 
significant nor exploited by entrepreneurs or coalitions of actors seeking fundamental 
change.  The events may have changed the nature of the debate, but they did not lead to 
fundamental policy change in the field of flood insurance; they had their influence 
elsewhere, not least in increasing FRM budgets, tightening spatial planning systems and 
improving information flow to the public (e.g. Johnson et al., 2005).  
But it is also clear that these events did have one other important effect: they 
reinforced the importance of the very existence of the extant system of flood insurance, 
to compensate victims and to allow the government to avoid itself paying compensation 
to those who had been flooded. The insurers made significant use of this ‘window of 
opportunity’ (Kingdon, 1995), but this was not to promote change but to promote the 
merits of the status quo. 
Assessment 
The research reported here has deliberately aimed at examining a process of change 
which appears to be slow and incremental, to complement our previous research on 
catalytic processes of flood risk management policy evolution (Johnson et al., 2005; 
Johnson & Priest, 2008; Penning-Rowsell et al., 2006). What we have observed is an 
institutional structure and a series of policy agreements which have shifted only at the 
margins over time but not changed fundamentally in the last six decades (summarized in 
Table 4).  What we see here is an unchanging element of FRM policies through time, to 
set against the changing overall philosophy of moving from agricultural drainage 
through to FRM, and from a dominantly top-down approach driven by engineering to 
reduce the probability of flooding to elements of devolution and bottom-up activity 
aimed at addressing both the probability and the consequences of flood events.  
 
Table 4 should be inserted about here 
 
The fundamental underpinning of government FRM policy – whatever it has 
been – by the private sector insuring against damage and allowing the public sector not 
to have to pay compensation should not be underestimated. This is why government has 
been so keen to obtain agreements with the insurance industry, which in turn has 
generally followed the ABI in presenting a united front in its negotiations. But there are 
many aspects of the process of incremental change that remain opaque, because a lack 
of transparency has been justified by ‘commercial sensitivities’. Nevertheless we now 
understand more about the overall policy for managing flood risks in the UK than 
previously - although much remains still to be uncovered in detail.  
What we have seen is that contextual factors dominate what policy change that 
there has been, and ideas of policy change that emphasise this appear most pertinent 
here. In this respect what has been important has been, firstly, the threat to existing 
household insurers from new entrants unencumbered by agreements to insure all-
comers. Secondly, the march of technological change has made exposure more explicit 
and pricing risk both easier and less expensive. The relatively stable role of the different 
actors and coalitions is now clearer, and we have seen that entrepreneurial activity has 
been minimal because the status quo has satisfied the main contenders: the government 
and the insurers. The many significant ‘windows of opportunity’ created by significant 
flooding or financial crisis have not significantly affected the pace or direction of policy 
change. The overriding importance of the profitability of the insurance industry – both 
to government and to the insurers themselves – is our explanation for the extraordinary 
policy stability that we have described. 
The policy windows theory of policy change (Kingdon, 1995) is not negated by 
these interpretations, rather it appears not to be appropriate for this FRM measure: there 
were ‘windows’ but they did not lead to fundamental change. The coalition of 
government and insurers continued to advocate the same policies and there was 
virtually no criticism let alone opposition to this situation: the ‘Coalition theory ‘ is 
therefore powerful not in explaining change by explaining the lack of change. At the 
same time “power elite” ideas are also useful: policy stability is assured by the ABI 
working with Defra and its Ministers to manage together the process of incremental 
change. Indeed, policy equilibrium is the norm in this context (Baumgartner & Jones, 
1993) largely because there appears to be no competing coalition of actors seeking 
fundamental change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), no groundswell of grassroot 
opposition (Alinsky, 1989) nor any fundamental change in the actors involved or the 
manner in which the flood insurance message has been framed (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). 
 
Conclusions and forward look 
In this paper we have described, analysed and – we believe – explained the slow and 
incremental evolution of policy in this FRM field of flood insurance. We contrast this 
with our previous analysis of catalytic processes of change (Johnson et al., 2005), and 
now see this slow process as also contrasting with the many profound UK societal 
changes that have occurred since the 1960s, affecting most areas of government 
intervention and insurance markets.   
In contrast to many examples of flood insurance and compensation in other 
countries, the early introduction in the UK of a system of flood insurance purely 
provided by the private market appears to have been a critical component of the stability 
of the system.  When the system was originally introduced the inability to accurately 
assess and price flood risk meant that any cross-subsidy was hidden and the system was 
considered acceptable to consumers, government and insurers alike.  Technological 
(and data) advances mean that the context has fundamentally altered and insurers are 
now better able to assess flood risk, and understand their exposure. Their customers 
(and their government) can see much more clearly now the cross-subsidies involved, 
and the Flood-Re proposals seek to continue the pattern so well established in the past.  
In many other countries this ability now to assess risk (and thereby more accurately to 
price that risk) is, we feel, likely to prevent the adoption of a private market system, or 
the high penetration of flood insurance where it is offered, because of the new clarity 
about cross-subsidy and the ‘unfairness’ that it exposes and the lack of the particular 
history on which our UK example is based.  
The past is therefore crucial; what then of the future in the UK? Based on our 
analysis of the past, can we predict or at least suggest the path of future policy change? 
In this respect, first, we would predict no fundamental shift in policy direction 
emanating from the current "understanding" in 2013. Flood insurance will continue to 
be dominated by the private sector, with government support but little apparent 
‘interference’. Secondly, the problem of cross-subsidy will not go away. With even 
greater transparency regarding risk, it will become increasingly clear that many 
properties at high risk are uninsurable, at least at "affordable" premiums. A transition to 
full risk-based pricing will be painful for those who occupy these high risk areas, but 
eventually may create a disincentive for unwise floodplain occupancy. Thirdly, the main 
actors will continue to be the insurers represented by some trade organisation such as 
the ABI and the government, each with an interest fundamentally in maintaining the 
status quo.  
Any failure of insurance per se will be "bailed out" by the government fearful of 
the consequences within the wider economy and concerned to retain London as the 
premier location for insurance internationally. These last forces are far more important 
than the intricacies of the flood insurance domain in the United Kingdom, while that 
remains reasonably profitable. 
Explanatory Notes 
1
 Interviews were not possible with the government side of the discussions and negotiations, as 
most of those involved here have retired or decided they were unable to participate. The 
six interviews cover most aspects of the flood insurance industry, but this survey is limited 
to those with the greatest experience and is not seen as fully comprehensive. 
2 
10 shillings per £100 insured, which is £0.5 in post-1971 decimalisation currency. 
3 
One government official indicated to us that in the negotiations concerning the ending of the 
Statement of Principles there had been as many as 20 meetings between government 
Ministers and the ABI in the 10 months between September 2012 and June 2013. 
4 
The UK Government Flood Insurance Obligation included in the Water Bill 2013 would be 
invoked if Flood Re could not be implemented or subsequently if it failed to achieve its 
objectives.  Defra (2013a, 6) suggest that this obligation would involve the UK 
Government regulating the insurance industry to ensure the “widespread availability” of 
“affordable” home insurance and requiring insurers to cover a quota of high risk 
households. 
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Table 1. Our interviewees. 
Interviewee 
number 
Interviewee position/affiliation and 
experience 
Knowledge of key policy changes 
1 
Current representative of the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
Current negotiations of the changes 
to insurance post-2013 
2 
Senior Civil Servant: worked for both 
Defra and seconded to the ABI during 
part of the period of the policy changes 
described here 
Involved in SoP2005 and SoP2009 
negotiations from both perspectives 
(i.e. the ABI and government) 
3 
Insurance company employee with a 
specialism in flood risk – also has 
undertaken secondments with the ABI 
Over 25 years’ experience with 
insurance and flooding issues with 
knowledge spanning all of the policy 
changes described here 
4 
An ex-senior member of the General 
Insurance team at the ABI 
Was involved in the ABI 
Memorandum of Understanding 
(2001), SoP2002 and SoP2005 
5 
Ex-insurance employee with a 
specialism in flood risk and climate 
change – also undertaken some 
academic study in this area 
Over 30 years experience with 
insurance and flooding issues – with 
knowledge covering all policy 
changes described here 
6 
Insurance consultant and ex-insurance 
industry employee with a specialism in 
insurance and flood risk 
Approximately 40 years’ experience 
with insurance and flooding issues 
with knowledge spanning all of the 
policy changes described here 
Table 2. Six theories of how policy change happens (after Stachowiak, 2001, p. 3) 
 Theory (Key Authors) Discipline How change happens This theory 
G
lo
b
al
 T
h
eo
ri
es
 
1. “Large Leaps” or 
Punctuated Equilibrium 
Theory (Baumgartner, 
Jones) 
Political 
Science 
Like seismic 
evolutionary shifts, 
significant changes in 
policy and institutions 
can occur when the 
right conditions are in 
place. 
 Large-scale policy 
change is the 
primary goal 
 Strong capacity for 
media advocacy 
exists 
2. “Coalition” Theory or 
Advocacy Coalition 
Framework 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993) 
Political 
Science 
Policy change 
happens through 
coordinated activity 
among a range of 
individuals with the 
same core policy 
beliefs. 
 A sympathetic 
administration is in 
office 
 A strong group of 
allies with a 
common goal is in 
place or can be 
formed 
3. “Policy Windows” or 
Agenda Setting 
(Kingdon, 1995) 
Political 
Science 
Policy can be 
changed during a 
window of 
opportunity when 
advocates 
successfully connect 
two or more 
components of the 
policy process: the 
way a problem is 
defined, the policy 
solution to the 
problem or the 
political climate 
surrounding their 
issue. 
 Multiple policy 
steams can be 
addressed 
simultaneously 
(problem 
definition, policy 
solutions and/or 
political climate) 
 Internal capacity 
exists to create, 
identify, and act on 
policy windows 
T
h
eo
ri
es
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 s
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
o
r 
ta
ct
ic
s 
4. “Messaging and 
Frameworks” or Prospect 
Theory  
(Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981) 
Psychology Individuals’ policy 
preferences or 
willingness to accept 
them will vary 
depending on how 
options are framed or 
presented. 
 The issue needs to 
be redefined as 
part of a larger 
campaign or effort 
 A key focus of the 
work is on 
increasing 
awareness, 
agreement on 
problem definition, 
or an issue’s 
salience 
5. “Power Politics” or 
Power Elites Theory 
(Domhoff,1990; Wright 
Sociology  Policy change is 
made by working 
directly with those 
 One or more key 
allies is in place 
 The focus is on 
Mills, 2000) with power to make 
decisions or influence 
decision making. 
incremental policy 
change (e.g., 
administrative or 
rule changes) 
6. “Grassroots” or 
Community Organizing 
Theory 
(Alinsky, 1989; Bikien, 
1983) 
Social 
Psychology 
Policy change is 
made through 
collective action by 
members of the 
community who work 
on changing problems 
affecting their lives. 
 A distinct group of 
individuals is 
directly affected by 
an issue  
 The advocacy 
organisation can 
and is willing to 
play a “convener” 
or “capacity-
builder” role rather 
than the “driver” 
role 
 
 
Table 3: Changes in policy agreements between the UK Government and Insurance 
Industry: 1961 to the present. 
 
Period/Date Policy agreement Characteristics of the policy agreement 
Pre-1961 Market driven – no 
specific policy 
agreement 
Flood insurance was a part of composite policies from 
1922, but total loss insurance not available until 1929 
(Arnell et al., 1984) but was optional and penetration 
was initially low. 
1961 to 
2001 
Gentleman’s 
agreement between 
Government and 
Insurance industry 
Insurers made an informal, yet strong commitment with 
Government to continue to provide cover to all 
permanently inhabited UK domestic properties.  
Coverage and importance was enhanced when insurance 
on buildings was made compulsory for mortgage holders 
in the early 1970s.  
20th 
February 
2001 
ABI Memorandum to 
Government 
The first challenge of the 1961 agreement to provide 
universal cover, but maintains a two year commitment to 
continuing availability, but required government 
commitment to increasing funding for and building of 
flood defences and improving planning in areas at risk. 
January 
2003 
Statement of 
Principles policy 
agreement between 
UK Government and 
the ABI 
This replaced the temporary memorandum agreement 
issued in 2001 and set out the terms of the new formal 
agreement between the ABI and Government re-
emphasising the commitments on both parts, but 
indicating that insurers are more likely to consider the 
refusal of insurance in high-risk areas but only refuse as 
a last resort. 
January 
2006 
Updated Statement of 
Principles policy 
agreement 
This reinforced the minimum standard of protection of 1 
in 75 years established in 2002, however strengthened 
the requirements for government to commit to reducing 
risk through flood defence investments and other flood 
management mechanisms. 
January 
2009 
Updated Statement of 
Principles policy 
agreement 
The final Statement excluded all newly built properties 
and strongly reinforced the message that policy terms 
and premiums should be based on the risk.  
Announcement that this was the final time the Statement 
would be renewed. 
Post-July 
2013 
Ending of the 
Statement of 
Principles policy 
agreement 
An ‘understanding’ between UK Government and 
insurers about a ‘Flood-RE’ solution which would mean 
flood insurance remains available but also affordable – 
but more clearly links premiums to risk but retains the 
existing industry-maintained cross-subsidy favouring 
those at high risk 
 
Table 4.  A summary of the key elements in the evolution of flood insurance policy 
arrangements, 1961 to 2015 
 
 
Change  
criteria 
Timeframe and arrangement / 2013 proposal 
1961 to 2001:  
Gentleman’s 
Agreement 
(GA) 
2001 to c. 2015:  
ABI Statement 
of Principles 
(SoP) 
c. 2015 onwards:  
Flood Re (FR) 
c. 2015 onwards 
Flood 
Insurance 
Obligation
4 
Actors 
involved in 
the process 
Private 
insurers and 
UK 
government.  
No real change 
– although the 
power 
relationships 
between the two 
has varied and 
changes to the 
departments 
involved due to 
restructuring.  
Little change – 
still UK 
Government and 
private insurers 
involved. 
But requires 
‘State Aid’ 
approval by the 
EU.  
Little change - 
Government and 
private insurers 
involved – but is 
likely to require 
the introduction 
of a regulator for 
enforcement. 
Universal 
coverage 
vs. selected 
availability 
Based on the 
principle of 
universal 
cover and 
insurance 
available to 
all. 
Little change - 
Later editions of 
the SoPs begin 
to challenge this 
notion with the 
potential 
exclusion of high 
risk properties 
and new build – 
however in 
practice 
insurance 
remained 
available to the 
majority.  
Little change - 
developed to 
maintain 
universal cover 
and enable those 
at high-risk to be 
able to purchase 
affordable flood 
insurance cover. 
No change – 
retains the basic 
principle of 
universally 
available and 
affordable cover. 
Cross-
subsidised 
vs. 
actuarially 
pricing 
By default 
created a 
cross-subsidy 
but GA 
actually 
permits 
actuarial-
based pricing. 
Little change – 
the SoP 
permitted 
commercial 
pricing but 
cross-subsidy 
largely remained 
and caused 
distortions in the 
market. 
Minor change - 
Involves the 
formalisation of 
the cross-subsidy 
already occurring 
but will occur 
between insurers 
as well as within 
their own 
business. The 
expectation that 
actuarially-based 
pricing will 
increase. 
Not yet known: 
Probably a 
continuation of 
the current 
system with an 
informal cross-
subsidy within 
the business of 
individual 
insurers 
Private 
market-
Private 
market-based 
No change still a 
private market 
No change - 
Insurance is still 
Significant 
change likely - 
 based vs. 
state-based 
system. based system. provided by the 
private market 
however there is 
grouping within 
the industry in 
relation to the 
pool.  
This alternative 
option involves 
a greater 
intervention in 
the private 
market by the 
government 
through 
regulation – 
although 
insurance would 
still be provided 
by private 
companies. 
